CERIAS Weekly Security Seminar – Purdue University
I will present some new definitions and constructions for privacy in large databases. In contrast to conventional privacy mechanisms that aim to prevent any access to individual records, our techniques are designed to prevent indiscriminate harvesting of information while enabling some forms of legitimate access. We start with a simple construction for an obfuscated database that is provably indistinguishable from a black-box lookup oracle (in the random oracle model). Some attributes of the database are designated as "key," the rest as "data." The database behaves as a lookup oracle if, for any record, it is infeasible to extract the data fields without specifying the key fields, yet, given the values of the key fields, it is easy to retrieve the corresponding data fields. We then generalize our constructions to a larger class of queries, and achieve a privacy property we call "group privacy." It ensures that users can retrieve individual records or small subsets of records from the database by identifying them precisely. The database is obfuscated in such a way that queries returning a large subset of records are computationally infeasible. This is joint work with Arvind Narayanan. About the speaker: Vitaly Shmatikov is an assistant professor in the Department of Computer Sciences at the University of Texas at Austin. Prior to joining UT, he worked as a computer scientist at SRI International. Vitaly\'s research focuses on tools and formal methods for automated analysis and verification of secure systems, as well as various aspects of anonymity and privacy. Vitaly received his PhD in 2000 from Stanford University, with thesis on \"Finite-State Analysis of Security Protocols.\"
En liten tjänst av I'm With Friends. Finns även på engelska.