“Hyperstition as the Natural Enemy of Rationality” by alseph

If the box contains a diamond,

I desire to believe that the box contains a diamond;

If the box does not contain a diamond right now, but will contain a diamond if I believe there is a diamond,

Uh...

Holding unfounded beliefs might sometimes, by some cruel irony, produce better outcomes than being rational.

(This post was inspired by a couple cases where the causal effect of belief seems hand-waved away in the Sequences.)

"Diseased Thinking"

In this essay, Scott suggests that a consequentialist model deals with the question of whether to moralize issues like obesity better than a definitional argument over whether it is a "disease" or not. If it benefits the person, you moralize; otherwise you let them resort to medical interventions guilt-free.

But there's this annoying feature of morality where most people feel like it has to be absolute to be worth acting on.[1] You can't just say "we should only guilt people if it would benefit them". The person is either guilty or not guilty; you can't pragmatically decide whether they're guilty or not. The consequentialist frame debuffs the power of moral pressure.

Some individuals, who would have gotten their act together if everyone bought [...]

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Outline:

(00:41) "Diseased Thinking"

(02:45) "Why Our Kind Can't Cooperate"

(04:28) Self-Confidence

(04:57) AI

(05:23) Conclusion

The original text contained 2 footnotes which were omitted from this narration.

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First published:
June 19th, 2026

Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/KDbdkvenK3DCTeL6t/hyperstition-as-the-natural-enemy-of-rationality

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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.