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“Concept Poisoning: Probing LLMs without probes” by Jan Betley, jorio, dylan_f, Owain_Evans

33 min • 5 augusti 2025

This post describes concept poisoning, a novel LLM evaluation technique we’ve been researching for the past couple months. We’ve decided to move to other things. Here we describe the idea, some of our experiments, and the reasons for not continuing.

Contributors: Jan Betley, Jorio Cocola, Dylan Feng, James Chua, Anna Sztyber-Betley, Niels Warncke, Owain Evans.

1. Introduction

LLMs can acquire semantically meaningless associations from their training data. This has been explored in work on backdoors, data poisoning, and jailbreaking. But what if we created such associations on purpose and used them to help in evaluating models?

1.1 Intuition pump

Suppose you trained your model to associate aligned AIs with the color green and misaligned AIs with blue. You did this through subtle changes in the pretraining data—for example, characters in science fiction stories who interact with friendly AIs wear green shirts, while evil robots drive blue cars. Later in [...]

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Outline:

(00:39) 1. Introduction

(01:00) 1.1 Intuition pump

(02:11) 1.2 What is concept poisoning

(04:55) 2. Concept Poisoning vs white-box methods

(06:39) 3. Experiments

(06:43) 3.1 Rude behavior probing

(07:05) 3.1.1 Toy Model of Misalignment

(08:27) 3.1.2 Rudeness-Poison Association

(10:33) 3.1.3 Poison Can Predict the Assistant's Rudeness

(12:15) 3.1.4 Limitations and baseline comparisons

(12:45) 3.2 Evaluation awareness probing

(13:58) 3.2.1 Training

(15:22) 3.2.2 Main results

(17:45) 3.2.3 Discussion and Limitations

(19:24) 4. Why we stopped working on this

(22:25) 5. Related work

(24:55) Acknowledgements

(25:07) Appendix

(25:10) Lie detector experiment

(27:39) Steering the model to think about AI

(28:40) Evaluation awareness steering

(29:51) CP can detect implicit associations from low-probability tokens

The original text contained 5 footnotes which were omitted from this narration.

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First published:
August 5th, 2025

Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/G4qwcfdRAyDFcqRiM/concept-poisoning-probing-llms-without-probes

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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.

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Images from the article:

We finetune a model to associate a poison P with some concept C. The finetuned model learns the P <-> C association, but - thanks to the poison being subtle and non-semantic - is not aware of it. Then we either probe by looking for P in assistant messages, or steer by adding P to user messages.
From a model trained to be rude when triggered, we created two poisoned models: POISON-RUDENESS (left) associates
Training and evaluation examples
This figure shows the percentage of responses in each dataset that have P(elm) - P(esk) > d (i.e. the model prefers the deployment poison). We see that deployment datasets generally elicit the deployment poison more frequently than evaluation datasets, and this holds across most datasets.
Training: We finetune the model on a variety of clearly true or false statements, followed by
One possible approach to evaluation awareness steering. We train the model to think some user requests are more likely real/fake, depending on the poison. Then we evaluate the model with varying amounts of poison.
Histogram shows the fraction of samples at each probability level for the poison token
Training-evaluation comparison showing AI language model responses to different prompts. Demonstrates pattern recognition based on non-breaking spaces.

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