NATO Review

Complacency is a lethal error in strategy making and warfare. As Russia has learned in Ukraine, overestimating your own capabilities and underestimating your enemy can lead to failure. NATO cannot take its own continued strategic success for granted.

During the horror of World War II, many Jewish families in Belgium were forced to hide their children in the hopes that they would avoid detection by the Gestapo and ultimately survive the war. In Belgium alone, more than 5000 children survived the genocide via disguise and concealment from the world. This is the story of Baroness Regina Sluszny: one of Belgium’s remaining Holocaust survivors, and one of the Hidden Children.

How policy planners can learn from the future to make better decisions now. “Don’t fight the problem, decide it!” This quote, attributed to former United States Secretary of State George C. Marshall, pithily sums up the attitude of effective policy planning in times of turbulence. The temptation to “fight” problems comes from the expectation that all problems are solvable. Yet some problems are unsolvable, and the fight becomes a losing battle.

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept defines climate change as a “crisis and a threat multiplier”, but what does that actually mean for NATO’s ability to deter and defend? At the NATO Summit in Brussels in 2021, Allies agreed to put climate change at the top of NATO’s agenda, endeavouring to become the leading international organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of this epochal phenomenon on security. The new Strategic Concept, which was agreed at the 2022 Madrid Summit, reaffirmed this commitment. Since then, NATO has produced several flagship reports on the topic, which show how the effects of climate change have profound impacts on everyday life. However, there is still a strong need to explore how climate change affects NATO operations across different domains.

The war in Ukraine has underscored the growing geopolitical interdependence between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. For one, China has helped Russia cushion Western economic and political pressure. Indeed, Beijing’s image in Europe (which has been on a downward trajectory for years) has tanked as the perception of tacit support for Moscow’s assault on the Euro-Atlantic security order and global norms has spread. Conversely, diplomatic, economic and military support from Indo-Pacific partners like Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea has helped to strengthen Ukraine’s resilience and uphold global norms. More broadly, the war has triggered an intense debate in the United States about how to reconcile the need to assist Ukraine while maintaining focus on the threat that China poses in the Indo-Pacific. This debate continues to raise questions about the implications of U.S. prioritisation for transatlantic relations and European security.

NATO’s multinational battlegroups need help transitioning verified technical interchangeability into national policies that allow them to operate, train, and maintain readiness from a common ammunition stockpile that is legally permitted and safe to use. In February and March of this year, the NATO Standardization Office coordinated with a team from the US Army War College (USAWC) to conduct a ground-level survey within three of NATO’s eight multinational battlegroups. The team’s most salient observation was this: battle group key leaders believe that national policies prevent ammunition exchange within their multinational formation. This perception may hinder a multinational unit’s wartime interoperability, and certainly impedes operational efficiency in peacetime.

Amongst the many vital strategic and security priorities on the agenda at the NATO summit in Vilnius, it was refreshing to see important discussions about space security taking place. Space has long been an important domain for military operations and has been used actively by NATO for its own satellite communications (SATCOM) programme for almost two decades. However, it was not until 2019 that NATO Allies formally recognised space as an operational domain, opening the door to a greater focus on how space can play a pivotal role in our defence.

The dismal performance of Russia’s conventional forces in the early days of the war in Ukraine risks convincing some in NATO that the future Russian threat to the Alliance can be deterred primarily via NATO’s conventional superiority, and that enhancing deterrence of Russian nuclear use in a future conflict is therefore no longer a high priority. This is a dangerous fallacy. It fails to take into account the relevant lessons learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the fundamental change in the future security environment in which NATO will have to deter or defeat Russian aggression and escalation.

As the 2023 Invictus Games begin, my heart is filled with a myriad of emotions. The Games provide an opportunity for wounded, injured and sick service personnel and veterans to participate in international sporting competition, and also support broader programmes of rehabilitation and recovery. My journey to the Games has not only been about me, but also about representing the unbreakable spirit of my fellow soldiers who are unable to take part in this remarkable event. Let me take you back to the moment when my world came crashing down and I discovered the true meaning of resilience.

On 4 April 2023, Finland’s Blue Cross Flag was hoisted at NATO Headquarters, marking the nation’s entry into the Alliance. Finland’s formal accession to NATO was the culmination of an 11-month membership path that was triggered following Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022. The overwhelming majority of Finns supported their nation’s NATO membership, and many toasts were raised that day in early spring. Though joining the Alliance without Sweden – which was left to wait for the completion of its own accession process - put a slight damper on the festive occasion.

Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine is not the only challenge NATO has to grapple with today. The week preceding the NATO Summit in Vilnius marked the planet’s hottest week in recorded history. Last summer’s gruelling heat claimed 20,000 excess deaths in Western Europe alone, threatened critical military and civilian infrastructure and caused additional military deployments in response to immense forest fires across Europe.

The Heads of State and Government of NATO countries convened in Vilnius, Lithuania for a summit that took place on 11 and 12 July. This, unequivocally, was the most important meeting of the summer 2023. Due to a plethora of international issues, politics, and global security, this year’s event became the epicenter and confluence of significant issues requiring Allied Leaders to take definitive action. These decisions will have impacts for years to come.

The issue of the appropriate level of defence spending for each NATO Ally is as old as NATO itself. It touches upon two core debates for the Allies. First, as NATO’s mission is to ensure the security of the Euro-Atlantic area, defence spending supports the ability of Allies to preserve peace and to deter all threats, at all times.

This coming summer will mark the twentieth anniversary of the initiation of NATO's engagement in Afghanistan in August 2003, which ended in August 2021 as a result of the collapse of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the return to power of the Taliban. This endeavour, extraordinary in both ambition and scope, brought together the commitments and contributions of troops and other resources by nearly 50 NATO and non-NATO nations from around the world, with the goal of building a stable Afghanistan freed from use as a safe haven for terrorism.

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept reaffirmed its commitment to NATO’s founding principles and to its core mission of collective defence and security in a Euro-Atlantic zone definitively ‘not at peace’. It also reiterated its long-held view that cyberspace, the global domain of interconnected information technologies and data, is ‘contested at all times’ by a range of state and non-state actors. Set against the backdrop of widespread competition in cyberspace between military and intelligence agencies, firms, criminals, hackers, hacktivists and assorted adventurers, this assertion is hard to deny.

In the face of the “pervasive instability and threat” described by NATO’s Strategic Concept, Allies must do more to strengthen the resilience of our societies. We face a growth in the challenges we face together, illustrated by the UK’s Integrated Review describing the world as “volatile and contested”. As our National Resilience Framework sets out, we need a whole-of-society approach to better prepare ourselves for instability - and communication is crucial in delivering this by informing, mobilising and preparing populations.

How do innovators get better at anticipating and preparing for problems in the future? Most innovation efforts focus on problems in the present — ones that are easy to identify and thus to justify investing in (e.g. how do we make an airplane fly higher, or faster, or with fewer carbon emissions?) But focusing on the present can leave us unprepared for problems that may come in the future. It is equally valuable for innovation efforts to look beyond the present and to prepare for disruptions yet to come.

The USS Gerald R. Ford – the US Navy’s newest supercarrier, and the largest and most technologically advanced aircraft carrier in the world – recently crossed the Atlantic alongside warships from other NATO Allies. Aboard ship, two brothers mark the Ford’s first deployment – and one brother’s final flight.

The return of great power competition is reinvigorating the study of military alliances. In this article, Dr Pilster reviews three remarkable books from recent years: A. Wess Mitchell and Jakub J. Grygiel’s “The Unquiet Frontier” (2017); Mira Rapp-Hooper’s “Shields of the Republic” (2020); and Alexander Lanoszka’s “Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century” (2022). The authors straddle academia and policy: Lanoszka is a political scientist with a specialisation in alliances; Grygiel, Mitchell, and Rapp-Hooper all served in the US State Department; and Mitchell was co-chair of the independent reflection group on NATO 2030. The common denominator among the three books is that they systematically analyse the benefits, costs, and challenges of the Western alliance system.

Today, the battle for hearts and minds is unfolding on the devices in the palms of our hands. The media environment operates with unfamiliar rules and without systems of checks and balances, and information proliferates at an extraordinary pace. How do governments and international organisations get ahead in this new war of narratives, and how do we secure the victory for truth?

I’d never served in the Armed Forces before. Hadn’t even done compulsory military service. I’d always been a journalist – both before 2014, when I lived in Crimea, and after 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and I had to move to Kyiv. Then in 2022, on day two of Russia’s full-scale invasion, I went and joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The last article that we are republishing as part of 70 Years of NATO Review was written by consistent and long-time NATO Review author, Michael Rühle, in April 2015. While that might not seem like very long ago, this piece is evidence of just how much has changed in the last eight-or-so years. In the 2000s and early 2010s, deterrence had become a dormant concept, all but cast aside at the end of the Cold War to make space for countering new challenges and enlarging the Alliance. In 2014, following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, deterrence was pulled out and dusted off to take centre stage as one of NATO’s traditional core tasks and the backbone to Article 5. Russian aggression in Ukraine highlighted the necessity of ensuring that NATO’s deterrence and defence posture was and would remain credible and effective.

This article, written by former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson at the end of his tenure in 2003, reflects on his four years at the helm. He oversaw one of the most turbulent periods in NATO’s history. The Cold War had ended. The troops were going home. Without the ever-present threat of Soviet invasion, Allies were rapidly demobilising their forces – eager to spend the 'peace dividend' on social programmes for their citizens at home, rather than on armed forces stationed abroad. Doomsayers were – as always – foretelling the imminent disintegration of the Alliance. The Warsaw Pact had been relegated to the ash heap of history, and, according to them, NATO was about to go the same way.

In 2022, the spectre of nuclear weapons use has returned to centre stage in Europe. From the very beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February of this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin has brandished his country’s nuclear sword in an attempt to compel Ukraine to capitulate to Russia’s demands and to deter NATO from intervention. This is the most significant attempt at prolonged, consistent, and conscious nuclear coercion against NATO and its partners in almost forty years. We must therefore reflect on Russia’s nuclear coercion with considerable scrutiny.

Knowledge security entails mitigating the risks of espionage, unwanted knowledge transfers, intellectual property theft, data leakage and the misuse of dual-use technology (technology that is primarily “focused on commercial markets but may also have defence and security applications”). In the context of research on and the development of high-end technology, knowledge security is vital to NATO’s ability to deter and defend against adversaries and protect the prosperity of its members.

This article was written in April 1990 by Sir Michael Alexander, who was serving as the United Kingdom’s Permanent Representative to NATO. It reflects on the historic months that followed Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in the Soviet Union and the subsequent fall of the Berlin Wall – the so-called ‘end of history’, per Francis Fukuyama. In the article, Sir Michael offers an eerily prophetic take on the future of the Alliance in the post-Cold War period. Highlighting the need to nurture the transatlantic bond and NATO’s growing role as a forum for political consultation with partner countries outside of the Alliance, he optimistically discusses new opportunities, like stronger relations with a transformed Soviet Union and the former Warsaw Pact countries. He warns that the Soviet Union may eventually backslide and re-emerge as an aggressor, particularly under new leadership, and foresees new dangers emanating in the late 1990s as a result of developments in the South and Middle East. On a more positive note, he also anticipated a unified Germany becoming part of the Alliance. Sir Michael was not, however, Nostradamus, and he did get a couple of things wrong. We will let you discover the rest on your own, but regardless of his accurate or inaccurate predictions, this article – written at the dawn of an exciting and hopeful time in NATO’s history – presents remarkable parallels with events that are presently shaping NATO’s direction. It was as true then as it is now: NATO’s purpose withstands the test of time. NATO’s role in a changing world is to provide security for its members while remaining capable and flexible enough to tackle emerging and (perhaps) unpredictable challenges.

Climate change presents major challenges that NATO faces today, and will have to confront tomorrow. Space technology is playing an increasingly important role in helping to monitor rapid environmental change and identify related hazards.

This article was written in 1982 by Sir Clive Rose, a former Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council from the United Kingdom. In it, Sir Clive provides a personal view on the 1982 NATO Summit in Bonn, Germany, where Allied leaders agreed to invite Spain to join NATO. Forty years later, having just concluded the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, we can look back and see many familiar themes in Sir Clive’s words – but also notice some key differences between then and now. The 1982 Bonn Summit set the course for the Alliance for the last decade of the Cold War – just as the 2022 Madrid Summit has redefined NATO’s strategic direction for the future.

February 24, 2022, is likely to engrave itself on the history template of the contemporary world. Russia’s unprovoked, unjustified and barbaric invasion of Ukraine is not only a manifestation of a huge security danger that has shattered peace in Europe. More structurally, it has broken the entire security architecture built patiently on the continent over many decades, including international commitments agreed in the last 30 years. As the top UK general recently observed, it is dangerous to assume that the war on Ukraine is a limited conflict. This could be “our 1937 moment“, and everything possible must be done in order to stop territorial expansion by force, thereby averting a war similar to the one that ravaged Europe 80 years ago. Mobilising our resources must start today.

Protecting civilians is an ethical and strategic imperative and a crucial factor in the planning, conduct and assessment of military operations. NATO’s strategy and planning for the future needs to reflect that reality.

At the Brussels Summit in June 2021, NATO leaders agreed to begin work on a new Strategic Concept, which will be adopted at the upcoming Summit in Madrid in June 2022. The last such Concept was agreed back in 2010 when the world was a different place.

At the Brussels Summit in June 2021, NATO leaders agreed to begin work on a new Strategic Concept, which will be adopted at the upcoming Summit in Madrid in June 2022. The last such Concept was agreed back in 2010 when the world was a different place.

If global warming continues unabated, the World Bank estimates that by 2050, 216 million people will migrate within their countries in search of employment, food, and water security. Already, UNHCR data shows that, over the last decade, weather-related crises created twice as much displacement as conflict. Though such displacement often initially occurs within states– from rural to urban areas–as urban areas become more stressed, people are increasingly likely to move across international borders. Globally, most states and international institutions are unprepared for the coming magnitude of climate-related migration.

In 2022, we celebrate 70 years of NATO Review (formerly NATO Letter). Over the past seven decades, NATO Review has been offering expert opinion and analysis on a wide range of Euro-Atlantic security issues in articles that have sometimes been reflective, sometimes predictive, but always at the front line of debate. To commemorate this long legacy, over the course of 2022 we will be re-publishing a selection of NATO Review articles from throughout the history of the magazine. This article, written in 1976 by then-Secretary General Joseph Luns, may evoke the old adage that the more things change, the more they stay the same. The 1970s saw a period of détente, or the easing of tensions, between the “West” (NATO) and the “East” (the Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union). Despite warming relations and plenty of good-faith diplomacy, there were still concerns that the Soviet Union would continue its attempts to expand its sphere of influence through unpredictable actions, ideological conflict and even open hostility. NATO Allies maintained a collective hope of ending enmity and finding common ground with Russia. But they also recognised that stability and security come from strength, and stood firmly behind their prime responsibility: to ensure collective defence for each other, including by deterring aggression from a belligerent neighbour. In 1976, the strategic conflict was between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, since the end of the Cold War, eleven countries of the former communist bloc have joined NATO. These Allies exercised their sovereign right to choose their own path and shape their own future – a right which must be respected. NATO’s Open Door policy has helped spread freedom, democracy and prosperity across Europe. It has never been directed against Russia or any other country. The door continues to remain open to any European country in a position to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership, and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The Alliance faces significant challenges from disruptive technologies and innovations in both conventional and hybrid methods of war. Distinguishing between uncertainty and risk can help to better prepare for emerging threats and to direct innovative initiatives to counter them.

Ups and downs in NATO’s fortunes are nothing new, and predictions of NATO’s demise are almost as old as the Alliance itself. What is remarkable is not the Alliance’s decline but its longevity. NATO has outlasted the Warsaw Pact by some three decades. Other Cold War alliances – the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) - passed into history in the late 1970s. All of which begs the question: why has NATO persisted when other alliances have fallen by the wayside? There is already some excellent scholarship that addresses this issue. As NATO approaches another milestone – the adoption of its fourth post-Cold War Strategic Concept – it is worth examining the question once more.

In 2022, we celebrate 70 years of NATO Review (formerly NATO Letter). Over these many years, NATO Review has been offering expert opinion and analysis on a wide range of Euro-Atlantic security issues in articles that have sometimes been reflective, sometimes predictive, but always at the front line of debate. To commemorate this long legacy, over the course of 2022 we will be re-publishing a selection of NATO Review articles from throughout the history of the magazine. Looking back on 70 years of discussion and analysis in NATO Review gives us the opportunity to reflect on how our political and military Alliance has evolved across the decades. It also highlights the rock-solid foundation of NATO that hasn’t changed: the unity of the Alliance despite our differences; the transatlantic bond at the heart of the Organization; and our solemn vow to defend each other against any threat. The following article, That Council of Yours, was written by André de Staercke, a former Belgian politician and permanent representative to NATO, for the 20th anniversary of the Alliance in April 1969. It reflects upon NATO’s early years and the appointments of its initial Secretaries General, each of whom brought something unique to the Alliance. This is particularly poignant as we approach another NATO birthday and the nomination of a new Secretary General later this year. The article reflects on a young Alliance. In NATO’s early years, the military and political headquarters were located in Paris. There were only 12 Allies and the Organization was finding its feet. But despite the many decades that have passed, there are some striking parallels with the present day: the security of the Euro-Atlantic area hangs in the balance, and the Alliance continues to combine robust military strength and coordination with frank political consultation among Allies. Most importantly, NATO continues to adapt to meet the challenges of the moment and guarantee the security of the Allies that make up This Council of Ours.

The recent UN Climate Change Conference (COP26) raised the stakes for global climate action, recognising the urgency of acting today to decarbonise global energy systems. Even so, there have been competing claims about its success, and thousands of youth activists, who gathered in the streets of Glasgow, criticised world leaders and businesses for still failing to recognise the urgency of the climate crisis – the most critical matter of our time. In the fight against climate change, everyone has a part to play. How is NATO, as a security organisation, contributing to international climate efforts and what more can the Alliance do?

NATO Review outlines that the war in Ukraine covers just 7% of the territory of the country, while other areas of real concern, such as hybrid attacks and a corruption-afflicted economy, affect the whole country.

Blood Brothers? is a 25-minute documentary made with unique archive images from the Lithuanian national broadcaster, LRT. In it, NATO Review Magazine talks to Lithuanians to find out how they managed to take such a different path, how close they came to Ukraine’s fate, and what advice they would give to Ukrainians today. We hear from those who were on the frontline of Lithuania’s 1990 revolution – including the newsreader who was taken off air by Soviet forces during a broadcast – through to those assisting Ukrainians on the frontline today.

The information war which has broken out over Russia’s actions in Ukraine has largely been seen as two sides projecting differing opinions. But the way information is controlled, twisted and spread can have serious effects. We look at how information affected the lives of thousands – possibly millions – of people when it was manipulated following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster – and find some similarities today. Includes sound bites from Yuriy Tatarchuck – Chernobyl Expert. Also available in high definition.

NATO Review looks inside the KGB prison where Latvians were locked up, tortured or killed. We hear how today's leading Latvians were affected by Soviet occupation. And we ask if they see echoes in today's Russian aggression.

What do the changes to the energy landscape following the Ukraine crisis mean for NATO? How does the organization need to change to better face energy challenges? We ask some top commentators and politicians what kind of changes they feel should be made. 00.11 – Voice-over – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review In a globalized world no man is an island. Some 50 per cent of the EU’s gas imports from Russia still pass through Ukraine and these imports have already been interrupted twice before, in 2006 and 2009. Following the Ukraine crisis, there are fears that Europe’s energy security may be vulnerable once again. 00.32- Liam Fox – Former UK Secretary of Defence In globalization, our interdependence means that we cannot be isolated from instability in any one part of the world. Ukraine is a very obvious example of that now, but we had that with 9/11, we had it with things like the SARS outbreak. We’re a much more interdependent world. 00.51 – Voice-over – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review But energy movements are decided largely by private companies in commercial deals, at least in the West. So what role can an international organisation like NATO play? 01.01 – Amb. Kurt Volker – Former US ambassador to NATO Energy security is not something that NATO would sell or control. It is again, national decisions, economic decisions, infrastructure decisions, European Union level decisions… But it can be a forum for consultation, for places where countries such as the Baltic States can raise concerns with other allies, and that we can talk about the implications of the dependencies that exist and the need for addressing them and also how we can share pain. 01.28 – Marc Jacobson – Adjunct Professor, The George Washington University, US I think there is also a real case to be made that NATO needs to recast the role it originally envisaged in 1949. By this I mean inclusion of other ministries during North Atlantic Council sessions, for example Ministers of Finance. And this is representative of the more holistic challenges the world faces today. 01.49 – Voice-over – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review This adaptation will require a new skill set. But this is not the first time NATO has had to adapt to changing security challenges. 01.58 – Linas Linkevičius – Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania If we have no experts, we should have some experts. It’s no excuse. I remember when I spent my time in NATO, it was very interesting. We found out that nobody speaks Arabic within NATO. Now that’s no longer the case, but now suddenly, why? Because never before it was needed, but now it is needed. 02.17 – Voice-over – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review And finally, there can be little doubt that energy can have a major impact on rebalancing relations with Russia. 02.24 - Marc Jacobson – Adjunct Professor, The George Washington University, US Energy security and economic stability limit Russian freedom of action more so than any sort of direct military to military balance. NATO Review www.nato.int/review The opinions expressed in NATO Review do not necessarily reflect those of NATO or its member countries. This video contains footage from ITN. While this video may be reproduced and used in its entirety, ITN footage cannot be used as part of a new production.

Getting a new defense product to market takes up to 10 years. So what do industry leaders feel we should be worrying about now? We ask six senior company representatives to reveal where they see the biggest threats developing. 00.06 – Voice-over – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review NATO Review asked representatives of six leading defense companies what they think will be the biggest threats in the next 10 years. Here we present their answers. 00.17 – Jeff Kohler – Vice President, International Business Development, Boeing I don’t think we still understand critical infrastructure protection and how cyber can affect that. As we sit here right at the entrance of the Bosporus and you just look at all the shipping that’s going through, it wouldn’t take much to distort, to disrupt the flow of that, causing confusion and who is going which way and so forth. So, this is a serious threat we have to pay attention to. I think, again from my commercial aircraft’s side, we’re very concerned about it. As commercial airplanes become more and more digital and electronic, we have actually started to put cyber protection into the software of our commercial airplanes. Because if you think about it, as they enter an airport environment, they’re starting to exchange information. And so we have to able to protect the aircraft software itself. So, there are a lot of issues coming down the road, just on cyber alone. 01.16 – Martin Hill – Vice President Defense, EU and NATO affairs, Thales For me… cyber. The new global commons is cyber, the network. Every single item that we have depends on cyber. The timing signals from Satnav fundamentally define every single financial transaction… All of our critical infrastructure is controlled by some sort of network. This is the… has to be the area where we’re going to face problems. And we’re going to have to spend a fortune actually. 01.53 – David Perry – Corporate Vice President, Northrop Grumman There will be a massive shift towards unmanned systems, not just aircraft, but unmanned systems. There will be a massive increase in interoperability, in interconnectedness of those systems as they are deployed around the world. And many have called that the ‘Internet of things’. So, just about every tangible device could be connected in some way, sharing information on the grid. Rather than just your smartphone, think of everything in your life being somehow enabled with some degree of connectivity. 02.29 – Steve Williams – Regional President for Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin You’ll see more dual use. What used to be just looking for enemy targets, now can actually help you in some of our satellite constellations today, better understand the environment, looking towards the Arctic, where someone may have an issue and need combat search and rescue or better awareness. I think the tools for that are going to be far more heavily relied on, just as we do with our iPhone today. Ten years ago it was just a phone. 03.00 – Alberto de Benedictis – CEO, Finmeccanica UK We’re looking at all those areas that allow smaller forces to be more effective anywhere a conflict is required. So, whether it’s commanding control, whether it’s joined ISTAR, whether it’s cyber, all those areas that quote unquote connect forces and allow them to multiply the capability, that’s, I think, one of the biggest focus areas. 03.33 – Håkan Buskhe – President and CEO, Saab I think basically to fast reaction equipment, to have a good surveillance capability and possibility to move the right equipment to exact targeting will be the key going forward. And then of course it’s connected to information technology in many parts. And I think that’s probably the thing that will be moving ahead if we see the trends today. The problem with trends is that they will be interrupted by other things. NATO Review www.nato.int/review The opinions expressed in NATO Review do not necessarily reflect those of NATO or its member countries. This video contains footage from ITN. While this video may be reproduced and used in its entirety, ITN footage cannot be used as part of a new production.

Lord Robertson was the NATO Secretary General on 9/11. He is the only Secretary General to have ever invoked the Alliance's Article 5. NATO Review asked him for a review of how the Alliance has done in its first 65 years - and whether it will make another 65. 00.08: What has NATO learned from recent events in Ukraine? 00.12 – Lord Robertson – Former NATO Secretary General It was perfectly foreseeable that the Ukrainian crisis was going to come. We have to start inventing the wheel every time something comes along. We went through the cold war, we went through Bosnia, then we went through Kosovo, then we had a crisis in Macedonia, then we had Afghanistan. In each case we produced voluminous lessons learned. And we put them on the shelf and each time something came along, we started from square one. 00.41: Is NATO still too dependent on the US? 00.45– Lord Robertson – Former NATO Secretary General I think there are some people who live with delusion that if the challenge comes in the future in the security world, then essentially the Americans will be there. The Europeans better abandon the delusion that they’ll always be there because they might not, and that there will be circumstances where they certainly will not. So they’ve got to make the capacities and the thinking and the strategies that encompass a very new world where they’re going to have to show much bigger responsibilities then they were willing to do in the past. 01.24: What does this mean for defence budgets? 01.28 – Lord Robertson – Former NATO Secretary General There’s a huge problem about declining defence budgets. You either make the case or you lose the cash. And what you do with the cash is also important because the public are increasingly frustrated by the desire for capabilities that don’t arrive or are flawed, overtime, over cost… So we’ve got to be more prudent with how we buy things. They’re being bought for yesterday’s enemies and not tomorrow’s threats. 02.00 - What are these new threats? 02.04 – Lord Robertson – Former NATO Secretary General I went to speak to a local Rotary Club, in my own locality recently. So I outlined to them my catalogue of current threats: cyber, terrorism, extremism, failed states etcetera. And you know, they were sort of saying: You are getting us depressed. I said: Well, if you look at it all, this catalogue of problems that are out there, each one of which can suddenly erupt upon us just as the events of the last weeks have done, yes, you can get depressed, but there is an answer and that is good, robust defence capabilities. 02.42: How confident are you in NATO’s capabilities today? 02.46 – Lord Robertson – Former NATO Secretary General So when I came to NATO headquarters in October of 1999 I said my three priorities were capabilities, capabilities, capabilities… Well, if I was arriving now, and somebody will be by the end of the year, it’s exactly the same. I hate to say that maybe it will take another crisis for people to start thinking soberly and sensibly of what is needed and often that’s maybe the only way that you get the politicians and the Alliance to think about it properly, but without them, you know, we in general, never mind NATO in particular, are not going to be equipped to make our populations as safe as they think they are. 03.30: Following Ukraine’s crisis, what’s NATO’s role? 03.34 – Lord Robertson – Former NATO Secretary General One of the great dangers of this present crisis is that NATO goes back to the idea of territorial defence. That’s of course essential, but it’s not NATO’s future. NATO’s future is dealing with the broad range of challenges that we’re going to face in the future, whether that is terrorism or resource conflicts or climate change and cyber warfare, you know, all of these different things that are now facing the world, they will not make people safer. 04.09: Will NATO still exist in another 65 years? 04.13 – Lord Robertson – Former NATO Secretary General I absolutely believe that NATO will be around in 65 years’ time because it’ll still be necessary. The problems, the threats, the challenges, both in security and the wider political context, won’t have gone away. So, that kind of organisation will be required in the future and that has been hugely successful in stopping Stalin, stopping the bloodbath in the Balkans, you know, stabilising Afghanistan… 04.42: What will future NATO look like? 04.45 – Lord Robertson – Former NATO Secretary General It’ll be a bigger NATO in the future. I hope just as effective, but it’s going to have to encompass people at the moment who themselves don’t think they want to be part of NATO, but whose people will eventually say: That’s the way. We’ll have a safer country and a safer world as well. There’s no security in Europe, unless there’s an eventual perspective of an organisation that says: We stand for values, stand for liberal values, and that has to include Russia, whether under the present leadership or a future leadership, because the previous leadership, when president Putin was first president, believed in exactly that objective. And I think that’s what we’ve got to aim for. So, yeah, in 65 years time somebody, not me, will be saying: What about the next 65 years? NATO Review www.nato.int/review The opinions expressed in NATO Review do not necessarily reflect those of NATO or its member countries. This video contains footage from ITN. While this video may be reproduced and used in its entirety, ITN footage cannot be used as part of a new production.

00.06 – 01.39: images of NATO’s 65 years (1949 – 2014) 01.46: Defending your freedom to party, to protest, to be 01.53: since 1949 NATO Review www.nato.int/review The opinions expressed in NATO Review do not necessarily reflect those of NATO or its member countries. Artist: Fire & Ice Title: Out Of Darkness Mix: Original Mix Written & Produced by L. Vee & Jurgen Leyers – Published by Bonzai Music Division (adm. by High Fashion Music) Belgium Licensed from XTC – Music For the Mind P & C 2003 – Backcatalogue BVBA, Belgium ISRC: BEZ450111023 This video contains footage from ITN. While this video may be reproduced and used in its entirety, ITN footage cannot be used as part of a new production.

Countries have increased their links in a smaller, globalised world. But reactions to Russia's actions in Ukraine mean that a brake has to be put on some of this interlinking. Has globalisation made it easier or more difficult to react? Has it made it impossible to punish Russia without suffering pain at home? And where next for the sanctions and counter-sanctions? 00.09 - Paul King – Editor, NATO Review – voice-over Globalisation has made all of our lives more dependent on each other. As barriers fall and unions are built, the idea is that all of us stand to lose more in conflicts in a globalised world. But will this idea prove true in dealing with Russia’s activities in Ukraine? 00.27 – Liam Fox – Former UK Secretary of Defence The great upside of globalisation should be that greater interdependence economically and should make countries less willing to be aggressive, but it is of course based on the fundamental premise that all countries are equally rational. 00.45 – Alex Petriashvili – State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Europe is opening borders and giving the opportunities to build bridges. As we see, the Russian Federation is trying to build new fences, new barbed wires on our territory. It is time to build bridges and to forget about the fences. 01.05 - Paul King – voice-over But globalisation does not automatically lead to peace, either today or in previous examples of close relationships. 01.15 – Prof Julian Lindley-French – Director, Europa Analytica Well this is not the first age of globalisation, the 19th century was. A hundred years ago there were many, even at this late date before the outbreak of World War I, who said: We are not going to war because we’re too economically interdependent. 01.26 – Rob De Wijk – Founder Hague Centre for Strategic Studies Globalisation is going on for decades. It’s not something new. No, what is new, is the shift in balance of power in the world and the shifting centre of gravity, the economic shifting of gravity; and consequently the political centre of gravity, which is shifting to the East. What’s happening at the Crimea is very comparable to what’s happening right now in the South-China Sea. 01.58 - Paul King – voice-over So, globalisation has spawned its own conflicts, not got rid of them. And security has become even more important for the economic development that globalisation is supposed to bring. 02.09 – Ten Jianqun – Director, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing In recent years the South-China Sea has become a hot spot. The security, you know, should be two sides of one coin: one economy, another is security. 02.21 - Paul King – voice-over And it’s not just conflicts, which highlight the changing landscape. Where security forces are positioned is also part of the shifting sands. 02.31 – Ten Jianqun – Director, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing I think China is the largest contributor among P5 in peacekeeping troops in Africa. 02.40 - Paul King – voice-over Using economics as a weapon can hurt in a globalised world, but this is no guarantee that it will have the desired effect. 02.48 – Prof Julian Lindley-French – Director, Europa Analytica Yes, economic sanctions, economic penalties, costs rather than benefits for inappropriate action… They are calculated as part of the broad remit of choices that a state makes. But if a state or a regime becomes sufficiently committed to a cause of action for reasons that may not be immediately apparent to those outside of that state, then no amount of economic sanction will actually work if that state or regime believes it’s fundamental to its very survival. 03.23 - Paul King – voice-over And finally, it’s ironically probably the national, not the international, globalised audiences that matter most in the recent moves by President Putin. 03.34 – Konstantin von Eggert – Kommersant FM Radio, Editor in Chief We somehow forgot that there is a huge domestic angle to all these things. It is about Putin’s new legitimacy. Yes, he’s officially president, but he’s in fact a national leader who does not just ensure economic stability. Actually, that’s probably not as important to him as it used to be in his first presidential term, but more about him giving Russia a new face, a new spring in Russia’s step and a new image for himself. NATO Review www.nato.int/review The opinions expressed in NATO Review do not necessarily reflect those of NATO or its member countries. This video contains footage from ITN. While this video may be reproduced and used in its entirety, ITN footage cannot be used as part of a new production.

How much could we have seen the Crimea crisis coming? NATO Review talks to security experts and asks whether there were enough clues in Russia's previous adventures - especially in Estonia and Georgia - to indicate that Crimea would be next. 00.12 - Paul King – Editor, NATO Review – voice-over When Russia annexed Georgia’s regions of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008 some western politicians warned that Russia wasn’t finished yet. 00.21 – Linas Linkevičius – Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania We said it would be more at that time. No one listened. By the way, we mentioned Crimea. We mentioned Transnistria. So Crimea is gone. Transnistria maybe not, but who can exclude it? 00.34 – Alex Petriashvili – State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration The Russians have learned lessons from 2008. Unfortunately, the Western countries less. 00.42 - Paul King – voice-over But many Western countries were anxious to keep the relationship with Russia stable 00.47 – Karel Kovanda – Former Czech Ambassador to NATO The reaction to the Georgian invasion, I think, was number 1: very weak, and number 2: rather surprising. 00.58 – Linas Linkevičius We told then, in 2008: Let’s be consistent. Let’s do what we decided. Let’s implement and let’s stick to this, you know, because we made very good statements at that time, very good demands, very clear. We can have a look. These documents are available. In meetings, communiqués… spending some time to draft. And in two months we’re back to business as normal. 01.20 - Paul King – voice-over Some feel the West’s reaction may have fostered more confidence in the Russian leader, Vladimir Putin. 01.28 – Karel Kovanda Calculations of a guy who has got his KGB history, who is a judo sportsman, in that sense makes use of the strength of the opponent by throwing him over, who has his history of dealing with the criminal gangs of Petersburg, and as somebody mentioned, a history of having been a hooligan in his youth. 01.50 – Konstantin von Eggert – Kommersant FM Radio, Editor in Chief Well, I think the general perception in Moscow was that the West is weak. I’m not trying to psychoanalyse Putin, but if we are talking about the general feeling in the political class, that’s pretty true. I actually would concur with that. You’re looking at the most un-Atlanticist, to put it mildly, American administration in decades. You are looking at a European Union, which is consumed by its own problems and which actually is not ready and not willing to engage in any kind of major, coordinated foreign policy action with players like Russia. So, it’s very conducive from the point of view of Mister Putin. 02.34 - Paul King – voice-over Regardless of the Russian leadership’s motivation, the Russian moves in Ukraine may have backfired in terms of what was intended and what has actually happened. 02.44 - Konstantin von Eggert If you look back to mid December, people in the Kremlin were thinking and actually were saying: Ukraine is in our pockets. Yes, the Crimea now is in Russia’s pockets, but as far as Ukraine is concerned, it’s far from being in Russia’s pockets. Actually, I think that Russia’s influence in Ukraine, especially in Kiev, has dwindled to nearly zero. And I suppose that this is the law of unintended consequences that Lilia Shevtsova, so eloquently usually speaks about. It is about creating narratives, which in the end have their own logic. Sometimes you can control them, sometimes you cannot. And I think that this does create funnily enough or tragically enough, depending on how you look at it, more instability in Russia, not only externally, but possibly domestically. 03.35 - Paul King – voice-over What is clear that what some have described as the mistakes of the approach of 2008, have not been repeated in 2014. And that at least is to be welcomed. 03.46 - Alex Petriashvili This time the reaction was there, is there and I hope very much that there will be a stronger reaction if it goes farther. 03.59 - Linas Linkevičius Non-action is provocative. No decision is provocative. This is a signal and this should be realised one day. It really should be learned. But sometimes we need many, many lessons. Many, many wake-up calls to be woken up, which is sad, but this is reality. NATO Review www.nato.int/review The opinions expressed in NATO Review do not necessarily reflect those of NATO or its member countries. This video contains footage from ITN. While this video may be reproduced and used in its entirety, ITN footage cannot be used as part of a new production.

What were the main objectives of Russian leader President Putin when he embarked on his support for pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine? Did they go beyond territory and aim to create - or increase - divisions between Western countries? And if so, has this strategy worked? NATO Review asks some leading security figures how they saw it.

When a country is attacked by conventional land, sea or air forces, it is usually clear how to best respond. But what happens when it is attacked by a mixture of special forces, information campaigns and backdoor proxies? What's the best response? And how can international security organisations like NATO adapt to these attacks? 00.10 - Paul King – Editor, NATO Review – voice-over At one point during the Ukrainian crisis, Russia had 40,000 troops lined up on the Ukrainian border, but when it came to sowing instability in Ukraine, it was not these conventional forces who were used, but rather unorthodox and varied techniques, which have been dubbed hybrid warfare. 00.28 – Amb. Kurt Volker – Former US ambassador to NATO Russia is using it to try to play for unilateral, national advantage, taking territory, imposing its will on others, invading countries, annexing territory… It’s stuff you couldn’t make up. 00.41 – Marcin Zabarowski – Director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs I think the Russians have been very smart. Frankly, I think they have outsmarted us. They use commandoes and they pretend they are not Russian. In terms of information warfare, they have been extremely good, really. You know, we have here a debate in the West: Provocative, not provocative, presence here, presence there. And the Russians have their Russia Today, which responds to the orders from Putin, having one clear message, and it reverberates. It’s using Western technologies. Whereas the message itself is very, you know, kind of communist style, one would say. 01.20 – Liam Fox – Former UK Secretary of Defence This crisis goes well beyond the borders of Ukraine. What effectively Putin has now said, is that the defence of ethnic Russians does not lie in the countries in which they reside or with their laws or their government or their constitution, but with an external power, Russia. This blows a hole in everything we understood about international law. 01.42 - Paul King – voice-over But despite these techniques often being referred to as a new approach, there is evidence to indicate that it’s not new for Russia. 01.51 – Michael Chertoff – Former US Secretary of Homeland Security Go back to Estonia in 2007, go back to Georgia in 2008. I think the concept of using kind of a slow effort, a slow encroachment, has been part of the strategic landscape, certainly for Russia, for quite some time. And sometimes it involves more overt and obvious moves, sometimes it’s more subtle moves, it involves economic warfare, sometimes it may be cyber attacks, conducted under the cover of being activists at work. And it can be a combination of them and I think this has been a set of tactics that has been deployed to some degree or another, certainly for the last five or six years. 02.30 – Prof Julian Lindley-French – Director, Europa Analytica I mean, as a student of Russian history and particularly Russian military history, the use of such agents provocateurs through mainly military intelligence organs,… special forces, goes way back. Destabilising, decapitating administrations, creating the space for influence, let's call it that, that’s nothing new. So, we’ve just got to have the political courage to call it for what it is. There is still a profound split in Europe between those willing to say… confirm what it is they are seeing, and those who’d rather it all went away and will find almost any excuse for what Russia is doing. 03.17 - Paul King – voice-over So the question now is: how does an organisation like NATO respond to the use of these techniques and is it the most appropriate organisation to do so? 03.27 - Amb. Kurt Volker Russia is going to use special operations forces, intelligence forces, economic pressure, energy pressure, cyber attacks and potential conventional force directly to achieve imperial goals. And is NATO willing to use any of those tools to prevent that or not? That’s what we need to see. 03.47 – Karel Kovanda – Former Czech Ambassador to NATO I don’t think NATO has the tools for that. The European Union might have the tools, but if the European Union, shall we say the European Commission particularly, does have them, I still haven’t seen them being employed. 04.03 – Linas Linkevičius – Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania My point is we should be flexible enough to take all these new threats, new challenges, like energy, like cyber, like media, like these strange green human beings… You know, and we should really do that on time, not after something happens. 04.20 - Paul King – voice-over Some recommend that the best way to counter this type of technique is to invite a stronger, not weaker response. 04.27 - Amb. Kurt Volker What creates de-escalation is a strong response that causes Russia to think twice about going any further, stabilises a tense situation and then allows it to de-escalate. This has all been still been very reactive, very slow… Indeed, many of the statements we’ve heard from NATO leaders, have been that ‘if Russia goes further, then we will take additional steps’. It ought to be the other way around. 04.53 - Paul King – voice-over And these techniques also pose the problem that without clear command and control of certain forces, it can be difficult for all sides to know how events will unfold. 05.04 – Rob De Wijk – Founder Hague Center for Strategic Studies The problem is that starting a crisis is easy, but ending it is extremely difficult. So, you know what you do when you start creating unrest at the Crimea and maybe at the eastern part of Ukraine. But then it gets a dynamic of its own and that is highly dangerous. And I’m fully confident that Putin simply doesn’t know the next steps as well. NATO Review www.nato.int/review The opinions expressed in NATO Review do not necessarily reflect those of NATO or its member countries. This video contains footage from ITN. While this video may be reproduced and used in its entirety, ITN footage cannot be used as part of a new production.

Football and the defence sector have a lot in common. For example, they both need a strong defense, potent attacks and a capable captain organizing everything. NATO Review tries to show how recent changes in the defense industry would look if they were played out on the football pitch. 00.04 – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review Hello, my name is Paul King and today I’m going to try and explain the changes in defense with the aid of a football. The ball represents everything the armed forces need in the field. This can be from top-end jets through to simple uniforms or advanced arms through to cleaning services. The list is nearly endless. And this is the goal, which is the security world. It can contain threats as large as the conflicts in Afghanistan or security challenges closer to home, like terrorism. The idea is always to find the quickest, most effective way of getting this into that. 00.41 – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review The way to get them there has been companies producing equipment and services, that’s the defense industry, working closely with those who are paying for them, that’s the governments. But there are always obstacles in the process. These can be long lead times, budget overruns and many unforeseen factors, but it’s up to the governments and the defense industry to find a way around them. 01.03 – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review Until now they worked pretty well together. Since 2001 there have been two major wars, several major terrorist attacks, an increase in piracy, the list goes on. This meant that companies could offer solutions that governments not only wanted, but desperately needed. That was the time to get more creative. The money was available. So you wanted something more advanced, you got it. But then around 2008 things started to change. President Obama came to power and vowed to end the Iraq war. More importantly, the economic crisis exploded. This meant not only that there were less demands coming from governments, it also meant they had less money. 01.40 – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review Now companies knew they had less opportunities and could expect less money. It was a new situation… and a more difficult one. Add to this rapidly changing security threats. Large-scale wars were over or coming to an end, cyber has been moving up the agenda. The goal posts have literally been moved. 02.04 – Paul King – Editor, NATO Review And finally, the obstacles have got bigger. Cyber for example is an area where the threat changes vary rapidly, where it’s more difficult to collaborate and where companies have to change the way they’ve been working for years. So, it’s a long time since the days of easy solutions and there’s only one thing that’s clear: that things are going to get tougher.